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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY STEVENSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
VERNON L. STEVENSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9529 
RESPONDENT'S PETrTI'O'N FOR RE'HEARING 
AND SU'PPOR'TTNG BRIEF. 
Vernon L. Stevenson, the Defendant and Re-
spondent in the above entitled matter, by and through 
his attorneys of record herein, pursuant to Rule 
76 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully 
petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in 
the above entitled cause upon the following grounds: 
1. The decision is erroneous in that :i't assumes 
the testimony of the plain tiff concerning specific 
acts of cruelty 'allegedly committed by defendant 
was undisputed. 
2. The decision negates the long established 
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principle that the decision of the trial judge is pre-
sumptively correct and should be affirmed unless 
the findings are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence indicating an abuse of discretion. 
3. The decision constitutes "judicial legisla-
tion" and in effect abrogates the statute by making 
incompatibility a grounds for divorce. 
4. !The attached Affidavit shows the existence 
of new evidence which adversely affects the credi-
bility of the plaintiff and if the decision of the 
lower court is reversed the case should be sent 
back for a new trial in order to permit the defendant 
to assert an additional defense. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent requests that a 
rehearing be granted, that the court re-examine the 
facts and the law and that the judgment of the trial 
court be raffirmed, or in the alternative, the case 
be returned for a new trial in order to permit the 
defendant to assert a new defense. 
HANSON AND BAIJDWIN and 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
By------------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
5t5 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
I hereby certify that I am one of the counsel 
for Respondent, petitioner herein, and tha;t in my 
opinion there is good cause to believe the judgment 
objected to is erroneous and th'at the case ought to 
be re-examined as prayed in the Petition, and that 
this Petition is not filed for the purpose of delay or 
to otherwise hinder the prosecution of this action. 
HANSON AND BALDWIN and 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
By------------------------------------------------------------
Rex J. Hanson 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
POrNT I 
THE DECISION 'IS ERRONEOUS IN TH'AT IT AS-
SUMES THE TESTIMONY OF 'THE PLAINTIFF CON-
CERNING SPECIFIC .A:CTS OF CRUELTY ALLEGED-
LY COMMITTED BY DE·FENDANT WAS UNDIS-
PUTED. 
'The opinion ~states: 
"In the instant case, there was evidence that 
Dr. Stevenson not only required 'Mrs. Stevenson to 
assume almost complete responsibility for the main-
tenance of the house and yard, but she also had 
to submit to every whim and desire of her husband. 
For example, Mrs. Stevenson testified that at night 
after she had retired, she was required to answer 
'all of the doctor's phone calls, was required to get 
him drinks of water, and when he had to make a 
night call she would get out of bed and move her 
car from the driveway. In one instance she did all 
the work when they were moving to a new home, 
while the defendant merely stood by and watched. 
The veracity of this testimony was not denied by 
the defendant. He merely cl'aimed that Mrs. Steven-
son had acted in this manner because of here 'spirit 
of cooperation'." 
In stating that "the veracity of this testimony 
was not denied" it isn't clear whether the court 
is referring to the specific conduct of the defend-
ant enumerated or whether the court is of the opinion 
that there was no denial by defendant of any of the 
testimony given by pl'aintiff in support of her charge 
of mental cruelty. We submit tha't the testimony 
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was in substantial conflict on all of the evidence ad-
duced by plain tiff on this issue. True, the plain tiff 
assumed the responsibility of maintaining the home 
and yard, not because she had to but because she 
wanted to. Her testimony on cross-examination is 
quoted verbatim as follows: 
"Q. You talked about the gardening, house, 
painting - did you ever have 'a hired gar-
dener to take care of the grounds around the 
house there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. There was a hired gardener? 
A. Not a hired gardener in the last few 
years, I found a handyman, I used to have 
a cleaning woman, she could get half way 
through that hig house on Friday. I said if I 
let the cleaning woman go will you get a 
handyman? 
Q. Were you there the summer before and 
had a handyman? 
A. I fired him. 
Q. You fired him? 
A. I didn't feel he was doing the work. The 
summer before we came back I hired Otto, 
he came once a week to mow the lawns and 
eli p the hedge. 
Q. Was there any enjoyment in this garden-
ing? 
A. It used to be I loved to garden and raise 
beautiful plants." (R. 68-69) 
* * * 
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A. No sir, I didn't attempt. 
Q. So you handled all this yourself. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that a source of irritation to you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you feel Dr. Stevenson expected you 
to do this? 
A. Yes, I am not irritated, I expected to 
clean the house. 
Q. That big house, as big as it was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is two stories or is it three? 
A. Three, a basement rumpus room." ( R. 
70) 
The defendant's testimony on this aspect is 
as follows: 
"Q. What 'about gardening, was there one 
em played to do the gardening around the 
place? 
A. As we went through it this morning, we 
have had someone to help with the gardening 
the last number of years. 
Q. Have you ever refused to permit her to 
have a gardener? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What about the cleaning woman in the 
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Q. Are there times she didn't want a clean-
ing woman around there? 
A. That is correct, that was her preroga-
tive. 
Q. What about having adequate appli'ances 
to take care of the house, did you deny that 
right? 
A. That never has been denied. There is a 
dishwasher, a freezer, a range and 'a refriger-
ator." (R. t22) 
On cross-examination the plaintiff testified 
about the requirement that she answer the defend-
ant's telephone calls as follows: 
"Q. You spoke about phone calls, there were 
times when Dr. Stevenson came home after 
an emergency and said that he was tired out? 
A. There were times, yes. 
Q. You felt he should get his rest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't resent doing that at those 
times, did you, Mrs. Stevenson? 
A. No." (R. 76) 
On this subject the defendant testified as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Now, at times in your practice, were 
you required to come home late at night? 
A. That is part of the surgical practice, I 
- when an emergency comes up like an ap-
pendix, an acute appendix, or an acute case, 
there is a great deal of work during the night. 
Q. And so far as answering the phone, did 
Mrs. Stevenson answer the phone - was 
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that to protect you when you came in late at 
night? 
A. She did it and very often she would say, 
'I am going to S'Creen these .calls, if it is some-
thing that can wait until morning I will do 
it.'" (R. 123) 
"Q. Is it true the telephone in your bedroom 
stood on your side of the Bed? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Isn't it true for Mrs. Stevenson to answer 
it she will have to get out of bed 'and walk 
all the way around the bed? 
A. No, that isn't necessary, it is available 
by passing it over. 
Q. You would hand the phone over to her 
to answer it? 
A. That is at her express desire. When I 
would work hard it was her desire for her to 
do that." (R. 148) 
Regarding the testimony that plaintiff was 
required to perform her household duties while suf-
fering from a herniated intervertebral disc the de-
fendant testified: 
"Q. Doctor, there has been some talk about 
a physical condition, some talk about a disc 
condition, and testimony - she testified -
I am not sure of this - getting out of bed 
quickly, do you have your version about that? 
A. I don't recall- that is contrary to medic-
al practice to do anything like that, I know, 
that is my recollection. 
Q. Did you diagnose any treatment? 
A. We took a trip, stopped off at Omaha, 
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saw one of the best neurological surgeons in 
America, Dr. Keeting in Omaha, to do a com-
plete neurological work at that time, that 
was ~about 1951." (R. 1'25) 
"Q. Do you recall when your wife had the 
back condition and she didn't have medical 
attention and had to push a chair to walk? 
A. Mr. Hanson, she has had all the medica-
tion, certainly she was helped with considera-
tion and medication, and during our stay in 
Omaha did everything that could be done." 
(R. 244) 
The word "paranoid" is a medical term describ-
ing someone suffering from !a persecution complex, 
(not an unusual experience of people considered 
normal in every respect) , the record does not sup-
port the assertion that the defendant charged the 
plaintiff with being mentally disordered. He did 
contend that the sudden deterioration of their mar-
riage and her subsequent conduct indicated she was 
undergoing an emotional change. On cross-exam-
ination he testified: 
"Q. During this period of time you told her 
you thought there was some kind of a men'tal 
problem? 
A. I said it was an emotional problem, I did 
not say mental problem to 'Mrs. Stevenson." 
(R. 1'51) 
On direct examination he described the plain-
tiff's attitude after they had returned from the 
trip to Mazatlan, Mexico: 
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"Q. What was your relationship after you 
returned from that trip with Mrs. Stevenson? 
A. For the first time the real communication 
broke down. We weren't 'able to say, ''Honey, 
let's do this or do that." I noticed Mrs. Stev-
enson had become more depressed and almost 
one of melancholia. That she didn't feel she 
wanted to go out with me, to the hospital, 
perhaps at my invitation while I was making 
my rounds. She didn't want to do 'anything 
that we ordinarily did. Our friends and our 
bridge club and our clubs suffered in that 
we didn't have the communication that we 
had before. 
Q. Did you suggest to her during that period 
that, after your return from Mexico, maybe 
she should have medical attention or care? 
A. I suggested it on several occasions. I did 
it in this way, I said, "Honey, let's have a 
doctor see what it is, you are losing weight" 
- this I didn't like. She had no color, and 
was tired. I said, '·'Let's have Dr. Hicken look 
at you." This time when we went back to 
Omaha she said, ''I need no medical care, I 
won't receive any. 
Q. What effect did this have on her? 
A. This, for the first time in her life, caused 
here to become aggressive, she would not do 
that." '(R. 127) 
Q. What efforts have you made, Dr. Steven-
son, to reconcile your marriage since Mrs. 
Stevenson left the second time? 
A. I h~ave made every effort to get to the 
basic problem of why a marriage should sud-
denly deteriorate. 
In my practice, I am ndt an authority, 
10 
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but I do see this problem in this age of mar-
riage. She was 4 7, there is a syndrome rec-
ognized all over the world known as a mis-
nomer or nonentity, it is called involution of 
melancholia of the menopause, it is an ac-
cepted term in every medical school." ( R. 
12'9) 
* * * 
"Q. Do you feel a divorce is the answer to 
your problem between you and Mrs. Steven-
son? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Why don't you? 
A. Because I believe this is a problem that 
can 'be treated medically. I feel it is a category 
that has no more stigma than diabetes, or any 
other illness that can be ta'ken care of, we 
know it has been done and we know it is suc-
cessful." ( R. 141 ) 
* * * 
"Q. Dr. Stevenson, have you ever told Mrs. 
Stevenson, or anyone else, she was insane? 
A. No, I have never said that." (R. 138) 
The following tes'timony of plaintiff is indica-
tive that she had a tendency towards a persecution 
complex: 
"Q. There are many things you did which 
you felt Dr. Stevenson expected even though 
there was no request of him? 
A. I think that would be true in any mar-
riage. 
Q. You did it in your marriage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you did it you had a feeling of 
resentment towards him, didn't you? 
11 
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A. Certainly.'' ( R. 7'5) 
Plaintiff's testimony lends some credence that 
she was experiencing the menopausal change. 
"Q. Mrs. Stevenson, there has been some 
reference during the trial to the menopause, 
I will ask you whether or not you are still 
having menstrual periods? 
A. Yes sir, I am. 
Q. Is that on a regular basis? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
Q. Have you experienced any hot flashes? 
A. Possibly three over the past three years, 
that is if they are true ones." (R. 233) 
The defendant emphatically denied that he had 
ever accused the plaintiff of being unfaithful to him. 
"Q. You have heard the testimony this morn-
ing, Doctor, I hesitate to open wounds and 
get in this matter, but as long as counsel 
raised it I have no alternative - have you 
ever accused Mrs. Stevenson. 
A. Mr. Hanson, I have never. I will state 
I wouldn't be here today if I had. 
This is not old wounds, this is something 
that has been brought up this morning. I 
wasn't even cognizant of this. This one inci-
dent was recalled at 'the deposition, that was 
explained. I have never accused my wife of 
anything, I have no recollection, on any of 
these other occasions of ever accusing my wife 
because that never has happened- and I love 
her. 
Q. Maybe the court might be interested in 
this urinary infection you have, will you give 
your version of that. 
12 
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A. This happens quite frequently, in a hos-
pital they catheterize the first twenty-four 
or forty-eight hours for a number of causes, 
in~abili ty to void, and there was an infection 
in the urinary tract that developed. 
Q. Did you ever blame Mrs. Stevenson for 
that? 
A. I never, I know I didn't ·(R. 245) 
The court is mistaken in the assertion that 
plaintiff underwent a series of psychological tests 
given by Dr. Branch. She saw Dr. Branch only 
once ( R. 34). The psychological tests were given 
by Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist. On cross-exam-
ination Dr. Korner admitted there is ~a gray area 
between normalcy and abnormalcy ( R. '172), that 
most people during their lives cross into the gray 
area and return. Dr. Nelson said there were neuro-
logical factors which played a part in the plaintiff's 
decision to terminate the marriage (R. 212). Dr. 
Brown admitted on cross-examination that he had 
suggested medical hypnosis to plaintiff which she 
had refused ( R. 1131) . 
Certainly the tri'al court could weigh the testi-
mony of these medical men in the light of their 
cross-examination and the ·circumstances that plain-
tiff had obtained their services under compulsion 
We submit that the testimony of the defendant that 
the marriage of the parties was ideal until it sud-
denly deteriorate three years before the action was 
13 
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filed was credible considering the evidence in its 
entirety and apparently was 'believed 'by the trial 
court. If the defendant did not deny with specific 
exactitude every incident testified to by the plain-
tiff, his testimony certainly constituted !a general 
denial. What man ·could remember incidents or dif-
ficulties with his wife which occurred twenty-five 
years earlier ('before the children were born)? In 
fact, a person who would remember these incidents 
with resentment might well be considered unusual. 
The defendant testified that his family was wonder-
fully close-knit; that the family loved each other 
and the children loved their fa:ther and mother; that 
in the family relationship they enjoyed the holidays 
of Thanksgiving and Christmas. Three years ago at 
Christmas the pl'aintiff gave him a movie camera 
with this remark, ''We are going to give you 'a gift 
for once tha't is appropriate" (R. '123) This test1-
mony was not denied by Mrs. Stevenson. 
POINT I'I 
THE DECISION NEGATES THE LONG ESTAB-
LISHED PRINCIPLE THAT THE DECISION OF THE 
TRIAL JUDGE IS PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AND 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THE FINDINGS 
ARE CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE INDICATING AN ABUSE OF DISCRE-
TION. 
The long established principle which has guided 
this Court in reviewing the decisions of the trial 
court in equity matters has been given frequent 
14 
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expression in the cases. This princi pie was announc-
ed in the following language: 
''The more recent pronouncements of 
this Court and the policies to which we adhere 
are to the effect that the trial judge has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in such rna t-
ters, and his judgment should not be changed 
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it worked 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Wilson 
vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 9177. 
Similar language appears in the case of M c-
Donald vs. McDonald, 120 Utah ·57~3, 236 P. 2d 
1006. 
"We adhere to the qualifications set forth 
in the more recent expressions of this court; 
that the judgment will not he disturbed unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court; where there 
has been a plain abuse of discretion or where 
a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought." 
This court has recognized the advantage the 
trial court has in observing and testing the credi-
bility of the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. 
And ''. . . unless on the record it is shown, . · . . 
that the finding is so cleary against the weight of 
evidence as to show error, the trial court's findings 
are to be upheld." Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 
P. 781. 
The substitution by this court of its judgment 
for that of the trial court in divorce cases is not 
1.5 
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limitless and should occur only where the first de-
cision is clearly erroneous. 
"In some cases we have used language to 
the effect that an appeal in a divorce case is 
in effect trial de novo in this court. Hendricks 
vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 6'3 P. 2d 277. 
The language would seem to imply that in a 
divorce case, even more than in an equity case, 
we will make our decision independently of 
the findings of the lower court. Even in an 
equity case, we do not overturn the judgment 
unless it is fairly against the preponderance 
of the evidence. The writer believes that every 
intendment should be in favor of the trial 
court, for not only does he in a divorce case 
have the parties before him, enabling him to 
test crediiblity by demeanor, but the conduct 
and m'anner of the parties in the court room 
sometimes gives much aid in solving who 
really is at fault. Moreover, a trial judge may 
'live with' a divorce proceeding in its pre-
liminary stages and know it from angles 
which the record does not disclose." Pinion 
vs. Pinion, 9'2 Utah 255, 262. 
The decision reversing the tri~al court fails to 
follow this principle. The testimony upon which the 
plaintiff has relied as grounds for divorce was in 
sharp dispute. Neither facts nor circumstances ap-
pear in the record, and none are referred to in the 
opinion, indicating that the trial judge clearly abused 
his discretion in making the findings on materi'al 
issues respecting the evidence which was in con-
flict. The opinion does not accord the trial court 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the "considerable latitude of discretion" which the 
law allows him. His judgment has been overturned 
without any showing of "clear abuse" of his dis-
cretionary powers. 
Even though this court may be "greatly in-
clined" to a view contrary to that of the trial court, 
such is "far from holding tha:t the trial court abused 
its discretion vested in it by law, and unless we can 
say that it is clear that it did, then its judgment 
and not ours must prevail." Sharp vs. Gianulakis, 
63 Utah 249, 225 P. 387. See also Rowe vs. Rowe, 
12 Utah '2d 291, 365 P. 2d 79'7. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence 
of this case does not clearly show that the trial court 
abused its discretion and it was error to reverse 
that judgment. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION CONSTITUTES "J1U'DICIAL LE-
GISLATION" AND IN EFFECT ABROGATES THE 
STATUTE BY MAKING INCOMPATI1BILITY A 
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE. 
The grounds for divorce which are now con-
tained in Utah Code Annotated, 30-3-1 (1953 as 
amended), have in substance been a part of the 
statutory law of Utah since 1888. The right to re-
ceive a divorce in Utah must necessarily be brought 
within the provisions of this !section. The granting 
of a decree of divorce under the facts of this case 
17 
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has the effect of making incompatibility of the 
parties ~a ground for divorce. 
The recent case of Curry vs.. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 
19'8, 200, 3'21 P. 2d 939, dealt specifically with this: 
" ... there must exist grounds for a di-
vorce sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of our statute, which specifies cruelty to the 
extent of causing great mental distress." 
Loose language in any of the cases : 
". . . cannot properly be tortured in to 
holding that a divorce should be granted where 
spouses are unable to live harmoniously to-
gether where the grounds are sufficient to 
meet the requirements of our statute are made 
out or not." 
This Court vacated the trial court's judgment 
granting a divorce to the plaintiff in the case of 
Holman vs. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 303, 304, 72 
P. 2d 829, in the following language : 
"The court well remarked that it seemed 
useless to keep these two young people to-
gether. There seemed to 'be insufficient pro-
vocation to grant the defendant the divorce 
so he chivalrously granted it to plaintiff. But 
the legislature has laid down grounds on 
which divorce may be granted. They must be 
present. The mere drifting apart because of 
failure to synchronize interests or ambition 
is no ground for a divorce although it may be 
that the parties cannot and should not be com-
pelled to live together." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The mere fact that a marriage relationship 
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has deteriorated to a point where its continuance 
is not satisfactory to one or both of the parties is 
not a legal basis upon which to base a decree divorc-
ing the parties. 
"It is not enough that they both desire 
a divorce or refuse to live with each other. 
Courts are not authorized to grant divorces 
except on the particular causes prescribed 
by 1~a w and then only when the grounds or 
cause for divorce is proved by substantial and 
satisfactory evidence." Hyrup vs. Hyrup, 67 
Utah 580,245 Pac. 235. 
Torturing the facts present in this case into 
cruel treatment causing great mental distress avoids 
the legislature limitations placed upon the courts 
in these m~atters. When the express declarations of 
a legislative body are nullified by "interpretation" 
such becomes judicial ligislation rather than judi-
cial construction. 
Much of plaintiff's evidence introduced in sup-
port of her complaint is picayunish. Some of the 
evidence referred to in the opinion of the court con-
cerns matters which occurred '25 to '27 years ago. 
Obviously the parties had adjusted these problems 
'and had lived a normal married life during all this 
time. The recitation of minor differences which 
have occurred over a long married life should be 
considered in light of the circumstances at the time 
they occurred. This Court should not encourage the 
timeless accumulation of such matters and permit 
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them to hang as a Sword of Damocles over the sta-
bility and sanctity of !a marriage. If a trivial mat-
ter does not constitute a ground for divorce at the 
time it occurred, surely the law should not mag-
nify its importance and give it greater legal dig-
nity because of the mere passage of time. 
Although minor difficulties may cause the par-
ties to become incompatible through loss of patience 
'and understanding for each other, such was not in-
tended by the legislature (and as previously recog-
nized by this Court), to constitute cruel, inhuman 
treatment causing great mental distress. An inter-
pretation of the statute, which in effect permits and 
sanctions a divorce on such a basis, is "'judicial 
legislation" because !a ground wholly foreign to the 
statute is introduced. 
POINT IV 
THE A'TTACHED AFFIDAVIT SHOWS THE EX-
ISTENCE OF NE,W EVI'DE1NCE WHICH ADVERSELY 
AFFECTS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND IF THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IS 
REVERSED THE CASE SHOULD BE SENT 'BACK FOR 
A NEW TRIAL IN ORDER 'TO PERMIT THE DE-
FENDANT TO ASSERT AN ADDITIONAL DEFENSE. 
As shown by the affidavit of defendant, which 
is set out as Appendix "A", he did not discover the 
letter referred to therein until August 9, 1961, which 
was after the plaintiff had appealed the trial court's 
decision. (The letter is set out in Appendix "B".) 
Inasmuch as the trial judge had denied the divorce 
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there was no reason to remit the case back to the 
District Court for further introduction of evidence. 
The reason for attaching the exhibit an'd affidavit 
to this petition is to show that there is additional 
evidence of plaintiff's emotional instability of which 
defendant was not aware until long afiter the trial. 
The exhibit in our opinion is !also pertinent in that 
it affe~ts the weight to be given plaintiff's testi-
mony on her alleged grounds for mental cruelty. 
In other words, was defendant's conduct the moti-
vating factor in her decision to seek a divorce? 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted tha;t on the law and 
the facts, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed, or in the alternative the case returned 
for ~a new trial with an order directing the trial 
court to permit the defendant to amend his answer 
in order to assert an additional defense. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON AND BALDWIN AND 
MERLIN R. L YBBERT 
Atorneys for Defendant 
and Res'pondent 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX "A" 
AFFIDAVIT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH ss. 
VERNON L. STEVENSON, being first duly 
sworn deposes and says: That he is the defendant 
in this action; that on August 9, 1961, he discovered 
the attached letter (referred to in the Brief asAp-
pendix "B") among the plaintiff's personal effects 
left there by her when she left their home and es-
tablished a separate residence. That he had no prior 
knowledge, or information, concerning the relation-
ship between the plaintiff and the writer of the ex-
hibit. 
VERNON L. S'TEVENSON 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___________ _ 
day of ------------------------------------------------, 1'962. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Sunday 4:30 P.M. 
To My Darling Girl-
For the past 40 minutes I have 'been fighting 
myself with discipline by refusing to phone you. 
Elaine is visiting her father - I finished my toil 
for today. I have thot of a dozen questions to !ask 
you by phone if you are not alone. So I can't stand 
it any longer and here I am writing. 'Today, I didn't 
dare get near you and Oh how I wan ted to. This 
is such a beautiful day to be 'all alone. What a won-
deful day to picnic with just you. Darling, I want 
you so much and it seems a crime to live this way. 
Always wanting but can't do anything about it. 
Honey- your note last night referring to my 
decision - I didn't want to infer that you were to 
make my decision in breaking up 56'78. That I will 
do when and if the time is right. 
It was grand to be with you last night and see 
your wonderful face today. You know, its just leaves 
us a 'bit let down when we are not alone - I want 
to reach out and kiss and hold you. 
Love and make believe kisses 
for now ----------------------------------------
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No, I never stop thinking of loveable you. I 
walk :about the yard- Just keep saying "~Oh, how I 
love Dorothy". Drive to Smith's Inn, again, 'I'Oh 
how I love Dorothy." Just keeps on going thru my 
mind. Again sitting here and listening to "SP." 
Bali Hai - '''Come to Me" - '~'You are younger 
than Springtime" - Then, I remember the first 
day of spring with you - yes, "Love is a grand and 
beautiful thing." How many times have a repeated 
these words - It just goes on and on - it never 
will let up- it becomes more intense- so result 
-very lonesome for you on this beautiful evening. 
Dar ling - how can I express more my love for you 
and how tender, beautiful, wonderful and lovely 
you really are. 
Now, "Happy 'Talk" - Talks about things you 
like to do" - Our dreams must come true. I am 
just crazy for you tonight - I can hardly stand to 
live with myself ~alone. I miss you so much tonight-
Good night - Sweetest Girl of all - I love you. 
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